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There is no single pure model of federation that is applicable everywhere. Rather the 
basic notion of involving the combination of shared rule for some purposes and self-
rule for  others within a single political system so that neither is subordinate to the 
other has been applied in different ways to fit different circumstances.2 
 
 
Regionalism has remained perhaps the most potent force in Indian politics 
ever since independence (1947), if not before. It has remained the main 
basis of many regional political parties which have been governing many 
states since the late 1960s. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which ruled at the 
federal level from 1999 to 2004, was but a medley of various region-based 
parties.  Interestingly enough, regionalism has also remained the main basis 
of the communist movements in India which have grown in close 
identification with the regions, and are sustained therein (Franda 1971; Sen 
Gupta 1972; Nossiter 1982; and 1988; Singh 1993; Bhattacharyya 1998 & 
1999). In the post-independence period, region is said to have often vied 
with the nation (Mitra 1997; Mitra and Singh 1999:155-79). 
 
                                                 
1 Harihar Bhattacharyya is Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, 
University of Burdwan, West Bengal, India (e-mail:  <harihar59@yahoo.co.uk>). An 
earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Seminar on “Federalism and 
Regionalism”, held in Puebla, Mexico on November 12-14, 2003, hosted by the 
Government of Puebla and organized by the Institute of Legal Studies, National University 
of Mexico. 
2 Ronald L. Watts (1996: 1). 
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The post-independence resurgence of regionalism in many parts of India baffled 
the observers of Indian politics, and offered as the basis of prediction of the 
country’s ‘imminent balkanization’ (Harrison 1960). The ‘crisis thesis’ which was 
implicit in Harrison has been the theme of many subsequent accounts of Indian 
politics (Kohli 1990; Basu and Kohli ed 1998). The basic question that I seek to 
raise in this paper relates to the role played by Indian federalism in ensuring India’s 
unity, stability and survival as a polity in the face of persistent regionalism, often 
verging on separation, rooted in manifold and complex social and cultural 
diversity, and mass poverty, illiteracy, extreme regional unevenness in 
development, and widespread inequality. The question has assumed special 
significance in the aftermath of the disintegration of the multi-ethnic and multi-
national Soviet Union, and the split up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
India’s record of relative unity and integrity stands in sharp contrast to many post-
colonial federations, which have failed, or broken down. In the age of what Eric 
Hobsbawm has called ‘nation-splitting’ (Hobsbawm 1991), India’s relative unity 
and integrity, and survival as a state is remarkable indeed. 
 To be sure, regionalism is rooted in India’s manifold diversity of languages, 
cultures, tribes, communities, religions and so on, and encouraged by the regional 
concentration of those identity markers, and fuelled by a sense of regional 
deprivation.  For many centuries, India remained the land of many lands, regions, 
cultures and traditions. The country of more than a billion people inhabiting some 
3, 287, 263sq km., India’s broad regions, socio-culturally speaking, are distinct 
from one another. For instance, southern India (the home of Dravidian cultures), 
which is itself a region of many regions, is evidently different from the north, the 
west, the central and the north-east. Even the east of India is different from the 
North-East of India comprising today seven constituent units of Indian federation 
with the largest concentration of tribal peoples. The British colonial division of the 
Indian territory broadly between the directly-ruled provinces, and some 560 
(indirectly-ruled) autocratic princely kingdoms of many sizes, religions, tribes, and 
languages added complexity to regionalism in India. Even after various phases of 
territorial reorganization since 1950, most regions of India contain many sub-
regions marked by some social and cultural identity symbols. In India, regionalism, 
or the acute sense of loyalty to the particular region manifested itself variously 
(Ram 1968; Rao 1975; Chandra, Mathur and Pandey eds 1976; Reddy and Sharma 
1979; Mishra 1984; Wallace 1985; Das Gupta 1988; Sarkar 1991; Mukherjee 
1992). It has often expressed itself in antagonistic terms to that of the nation, 
fuelled as it is by the sense of enduring deprivation due to long-term neglect in 
development, and resource redistribution. Regionalism has often expressed itself in 
terms, which are opposed to national unity and integrity, and challenging to the 
legitimacy of the state. While the rulers have most often liked to see in regionalism 
“a very serious threat to the development, progress and unity of the country” 
(Gandhi 1969: 85), some scholars have expressed similar views by seeing 
regionalism as “anti-system, anti-federal” and so on (Reddy 1979). But positively 
oriented scholar have seen values in regionalism in the context of building the 
nation, or national cohesion provided the political system is accommodative of 
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timely meeting the demands of the regions (Mukherjee 1992: 12). The literature on 
regionalism, its meaning, forms, causes and consequences in India etc are already 
vast, and there is perhaps little to add to clarifying the meaning of regionalism in 
India, or its forms and content. The basic point that I would highlight in this respect 
is that internal self-determination of community, whether linguistic, tribal, 
religious, regional, or their combinations, has remained the predominant form in 
which regionalism in India has sought to express itself, historically as well as 
contemporaneously. Most often, self-determination has been couched in terms of 
statehood or state autonomy. 
 
 
A R G U M E N T  
 
As a study of the interaction between federalism and regionalism in India, this 
paper seeks to focus on Indian federalism as a method of accommodation of 
regionalism in India. Federalism is seen here as a political equilibrium, which 
results from the appropriate balance between shared rule and self-rule. In the post-
Second World War period, many post-colonial countries adopted federalism as a 
method of governance in multi-ethnic contexts, but in majority of cases, the 
experiments failed resulting in territorial disintegration in some  (Watts 1968; 
Bhattacharyya 2001; O’Leary 2001). The reason why they failed was not because 
federalism was adopted as a recipe, but the way federalism was perceived and 
applied. As Watts has rightly pointed out above, there is no pure model of 
federation that can be applied everywhere. The need for federalism is enhanced in 
countries with ethnically distinct regions where the territorial accommodation of 
distinct groups of people is of paramount importance. For those countries, a 
combination of shared rule (for general purposes of unity) and some kind of self-
rule (for regional/local purposes of diversity) is a must if unity and integrity are to 
be maintained.  
 This paper thus seeks to advance the following four ideas as a conceptual 
preface to the discussion. First, there is no necessary conflict between federalism 
and regionalism. The relations between the two may be conflicting as well as 
collaborating depending on the manner of accommodation, if any, which is 
undertaken in a federal system. Federalism and regionalism may be complementing 
each other in the practical political processes. The need for balance is of utmost 
importance if unity of the country is not to be risked.  
 Second, federation rather than a nation-state, ideal-typically, is better able to 
accommodate ethnically distinct regions because while the nation-state demands 
uniformity, federalism is based on the recognition of differences. This assumes 
special significance when the top-down approach to federation-building is 
followed.  
 Third, a two-tier federation may not be sufficient to accommodate regionalism 
of many forms and levels. A tier below the ‘states’, or ‘provinces’ with appropriate 
constitutional guarantee may be necessary for regional accommodation. 
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Four, regionalization may itself be a technique for ethno-regional accommodation 
provided both the constitutional input and a sufficient ethno-regional pressures 
from below are available. Following this technique, the spill-over effects of 
regional discontent are minimized.  
 
 
R O O T S  O F  R E G I O N A L I S M  I N  I N D I A :  
I N D I A ’ S  M A N I F O L D  D I V E R S I T Y  
 
Regionalism in India has been rooted in India’s manifold diversity. India, 
demographically speaking, is the second largest country (its population over a 
billion now) after China, and socially and culturally the most diverse in the world. 
India’s one billion plus people live today in 28 States (federal units) (doubled since 
the inauguration of the Constitution in 1950) and 7 Union Territories (centrally 
ruled).  Formed over many thousand years as a country of immigrants who brought 
their own cultures and traditions, India’s diversity is proverbial. Although 
predominantly inhabited by the ‘Hindus’ (over 80 per cent) who are, however, 
regionally specific, plural in beliefs and practices, and divided by castes, and 
languages, India contains large proportions of Muslims (about 13%) spread over 
the country with more than a million in as many as 13 states (out of 28), Sikhs, 
Buddhists, Christian, Jains and so on (Table.1). 
 
Table 1:  Religious Composition of Indian Population (2001) 
 
Religion Population % to total population 
Hindus 827,578,868 80.5% 
Muslims 138,188,240 13.4% 
Christians 24,080,016 2.3% 
Sikhs 19,215,730 1.9% 
Buddhists 7,955,207 0.8% 
Jains 4,225,053 0.4% 
Other religions 6,639,626 0.6% 
Religion not stated n.a. 0.1% 
Total 1,028,610,328 100% 
 
 
Source: Census Reports of India, 2001. 
 
Three features stand out from Table 1 above regarding regional concentration of 
religious groups in India. First, there is only one Muslim majority state in India, 
viz., Jammu & Kashmir. This was due, not to any reorganization of territory, but to 
the fact that the Kashmiri Muslims have been living in Kashmir for centuries. 
Second, there are three Christian majority states in India, all in the North-East, viz., 
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Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram. These states, again, were created since the 
1960s, by carving out of Assam, not on the basis of religion, but as a method of 
recognizing tribal ethnicity. Third, Sikhs are concentrated in Punjab where they 
form a majority. Punjab was created in 1966 as a result of reorganization of Indian 
territories on ethno-religious basis.  
 India’s linguistic diversity is proverbial. By one estimate, there were some 
1,632 languages spoken in India (Basu 1997: 187). So far, eighteen languages have 
been ‘officially recognized’ and placed under the 8th Schedule of the Constitution 
as a symbolic recognition of identity (Table. 2). Today, the speakers of such 18 
language constitute about 91 per cent of the population. Many of India’s languages 
are very ancient with strong literary traditions. Some of the so-called regional 
languages, most notably Tamil (a south Indian language), are, in fact, older than 
Hindi, spoken by the largest (but not the majority) number of Indians. During the 
period of British colonial rule, language and region did not always coincide. Thus, 
the provinces created by the British in India were not linguistically homogenous. 
Many of the provinces as well as the princely autocracies were bilingual, or even 
trilingual. In the wake of India’s national liberation movements, many of the 
region-based linguistic groups became self-conscious, and demanded self-
determination. (Bhattacharyya 1989; Chatterjee 1986 and 1993) Linguistic 
Provinces Commission (popularly known as the Dar Commission) formed on 17 
June 1948 to advise the Constituent Assembly (1946-49) correctly sensed the 
situation: “Indian nationalism is deeply wedded to its regional languages; Indian 
patriotism is aggressively attached to its provincial frontiers”(Bhattacharyya 2001: 
100).  In the post-independence period, it is language, not religion, which, when 
coupled with regional and tribal identity, has provided the most powerful 
instrument for political recognition as an ethno-national identity.  
    HARIHAR BHATTACHARYYA 
 
6 
 
Table 2: India’s Official Languages (1991) 
 
Language Number of Speakers 
Assamese 13,079,696 
Bengali 69,595,738 
Gujarati 40,673,814 
Hindi 337,272,114 
Kannada 32,753,676 
Kashmiri 56,693 
Konkani 1,760,607 
Malayalam 30,337,176 
Manipuri 1,270,216 
Marathi 62,481,681 
Nepali 2,076,645 
Oriya 28,061,313 
Punjabi 32,753,676 
Sanskrit 49,736 
Sindhi 2,122,848 
Tamil 53,006,368 
Telugu 66,017,615 
Urdu 43,406,932 
 
Source: Census Report of India, 1991. Excludes figures from Jammu & Kashmir 
 
Except Sindhi, Urdu and Sanskrit, all the languages listed above are strongly 
regionally rooted, and states or sub-states have been created with autonomous 
powers in order to accommodate, politically, linguistic identity. That does not 
mean, however, that all the linguistic communities have got statehood, or political 
association in India. Beyond such ‘official languages’ there are some 96 languages 
(Census Report of India, 1991), which are ‘non-scheduled’ languages (with, or 
without scripts) with significant number of speakers regionally rooted as well as 
spread throughout India. Also, even after successive waves of reorganization of 
federal territory since the 1950s, there are numerically significant minority 
languages in State and Union Territory (Census Report of India, 1991). Thus, the 
issue of regionalism, whether based on languages, tribal ethnicity, or a combination 
of region, tribal ethnicity, and/or language, remains open. For instance, in the 
creation of the last three states in 2000, namely, Uttaranchal, Chhatisgarh and 
Jharkhand, language did not play the predominant role (Bhattacharyya 2001). A 
complex of tribal ethnicity, language, regional deprivation and ecology provided 
the basis of intense regionalism, and its resolution in statehood (Bhattacharyya 
2001). The Tripura Tribal Autonomous District Council (TTADC) in Tripura, in 
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India’s North-East, formed  in 1983, under the 6th Schedule of the Indian 
Constitution with autonomous powers covering some two-thirds areas of the state 
predominantly inhabited by the aboriginal peoples (minorities in the state), 
provides a successful example of accommodation of regionalism, which is 
protective of endangered tribal identity (Bhattacharyya 2003). The other successful 
case is the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) in the northern most district of 
West Bengal. In the proposed Bodoland Territorial Council in Assam, in India’s 
North-East, to be created under the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution, the 
Bodos, the minority in Assam, will not, however, be in majority in the Bodoland, 
but this is going to be an attempt to protect their identity in the regions in which 
they live. 
 
 
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L  I N P U T  
 
The Constitution of India (1950) has remained a resource as well as an instrument 
for various regional movements for self-determination to fight for the appropriate 
political institution within which to secure ethno-regional identity. The section that 
follows discusses both the non-territorial and territorial measures available within 
the Constitution of India which have strengthened rather than weakened the hands 
of regionalism without, however, hampering the cause of national unity. 
 
 
N O N - T E R R I T O R I A L  M E A S U R E :  
O F F I C I A L  R E C O G N I T I O N  O F  L A N G U A G E S  
 
The non-territorial measures of accommodating ethno-regional identity in India 
consist of the following. First, the right to language forms part of the fundamental 
‘cultural and educational rights of minorities’ (Art. 30 of the Indian Constitution) 
which stipulates that the minorities shall have the right to establish and administer 
educational institutions of their choice. The state shall not impose upon it any 
culture other than the community’s own culture. 
 Second, there is provision (under Articles 345 & 347) for ‘officially 
recognizing’ languages by placing a particular language under the 8th Schedule of 
the Constitution. So far eighteen languages have been ‘officially’ recognized in 
India (Table. 2). This method seeks to accommodate linguistic group(s) in three 
ways. First, it satisfies the need for identity (linguistic) for the aggrieved 
community. Second, it entitles the linguistic community to demand to read, among 
others, all official communication and documents in their language. Third, such 
languages as ‘officially’ recognized and placed under the 8th Schedule of the Indian 
Constitution, become the third language in India’s so-called ‘three-language 
formula’ i.e., Hindi (national language), English (link language), and the 8th 
Schedule language, as mentioned above. In actual political process, the demand for 
the official recognition of languages has most often been intertwined with the 
movements for political recognition of identity. 
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 Third, there is an individual dimension to it. Although ‘Hindi’ in Devnagari 
script is the ‘official language of the Union’ (Art. 343), any petitioner (Art.350) in 
submitting any representation for the redress of any grievance to any officer of the 
Union or a State, is authorized to use any languages used in the Union, or in the 
State. That is, any officer cannot reject such representation on the ground that it is 
not written in Hindi. It is further stipulated that every state and the local authorities 
within a state have to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother-
tongue at the primary stage of education to children of the minority groups. No less 
than the President of India has been authorized by the Constitution (Art. 350 A) to 
issue such directive to the states to such effects.  
 Two remaining issues regarding the identity implications of languages must 
also be pointed out. In India, there are both stateless linguistic minorities which 
speak a language, which is not ‘officially’ recognized, and which do not have a 
state. Second, there are states, most notably in India’s Northeast where the local 
language/dialects spoken by overwhelming number of the people are not yet 
‘officially’ recognized. This is, for instance, the case in Meghalaya, Mizoram and 
Nagaland where the state level official languages are not those spoken by the 
majority of the people in the states.    
 The above non-territorial measures for the recognition and protection of 
linguistic identity have served, however, to encourage the movement for 
territorial/regional  recognition of  ethnic identity, particularly when the linguistic 
or other ethnic groups inhabit a particular region, and are predominant. It can also 
work the other way round:  achievement of statehood as a regional recognition of 
identity gives a fillip to increased self-awareness for a distinct linguistic identity. 
There are also odd examples. In Mizoram, Meghalaya and Nagaland, India’s three 
Christian-majority states in the North-East, the  languages used for official 
purposes are Hindi, and English (link language), and not the languages spoken by 
the people in those states. This is because distinct Naga, Khasi and Mizo languages 
are yet to be developed which is intelligible to various tribes. In Manipur, another 
state in the North-east, the scenario is the same as above except that there is a 
Manipuri language which is placed under the 8th Schedule of the Indian 
Constitution. 
 
 
T E R R I T O R I A L  M E A S U R E S  F O R  
A C C O M M O D A T I N G  R E G I O N A L I S M  
 
Article 1 (1) of the Indian Constitution calls India “a Union of States”, not a 
federation. Except the Preamble (1976), the term ‘federation’ has nowhere been 
used in the Constitution. The main reason why the term ‘federation’ was not used 
was that the term ‘federation’ in the 1940s in India was suspect, a recipe for 
disintegration. Elsewhere I have discussed the issue (Bhattacharyya: 2001) in 
detail. Although India is a “Union of States”, the number of States constituting the 
“Union” is not specified. Had it been so, it would have been difficult, if not 
impossible, to accommodate the growing ethno-regional identity aspirations. The 
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political map of India, at independence, was far from complete. A lot of territorial 
adjustment and re-adjustment was to be done to right-size the state keeping in mind 
the country’s manifold diversity, and multiple identities. The number of States in 
India has thus remained changing. One way of creating a new State has been by up-
gradation of centrally-ruled Union Territories which today are 7 in number. Up-
gradation of Union Territories to statehood has remained one method for fulfilling 
the identity aspirations of ethnically significant people living within the given 
territory. Statehood means relatively more autonomous powers, and freedom of 
action within the federation than a Union Territory status affords. 
 
M e a s u r e s  f o r  S t a t e h o o d  
 
The constitutional provisions for the creation of new states in India are rather 
flexible. The Indian federation, constitutionally speaking, is an indestructible union 
of destructible states. The Indian Constitution (Articles 3-4) empowers the Union 
Parliament (Lok Sabha (popularly elected Lower House, and Rajya Sabha, the 
Council of States) to reorganize the states for territorial adjustment. It is provided 
that Parliament may by law:  
 
(1) form a new state by separation of territory from any state, or by uniting two 
or more states, or parts of states, or by uniting any territory to a part of any 
state;  
(2) increase the area of any state;  
(3) diminish the area of any state;  
(4) alter the boundaries of any state; and  
(5) alter the name of any state etc. 
 
The legislative requirement on the part of Parliament to do so is by a simple 
majority, and by the ordinary legislative process. However, the Presidential 
recommendation for introducing such a Bill is required, and the President is 
required, before he recommends, to refer the Bill to the Legislature of the state to 
be affected by the proposed changes within a specified period of time. The 
President is not, however, bound to accept the view of the state legislature. So far 
more than 20 Acts have been passed by the parliament to give effect to states 
reorganization. In the cases of the three new states, the constitutional procedures 
have been followed, and the Legislative Assemblies of the three affected states 
have debated the proposed changes and the Bill for years before agreeing to the 
proposed changes. Democratic method has informed the legislative process. 
 
M e a s u r e s  f o r  A b o r i g i n a l  S e l f - G o v e r n a n c e :  t h e  S i x t h  S c h e d u l e  
 
The constitution of India contains a number of special provisions under the 
schedules five to seven for the self-governance of various tribal groups living in 
various parts of India. These measures are designed to accommodate sub-
regionalism within a broader region, whether based on tribal identity, or linguistic 
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identity.  However, the provisions under the fifth and the seventh schedules are not 
as empowering (the tribal) as those in the sixth schedule. The Sixth Schedule has 
the constitutional sanctity, (and hence more federalizing) than the fifth and the 
seventh schedules. The salient aspects of the Sixth Schedule relating to tribal self-
governance may be identified as follows: 
 
(1) The provisions of the Sixth Schedule (Articles 244(2) and 275(1) deal with 
the tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. There are nine 
such areas falling under the 6th Schedule. These tribal areas are to be 
governed as autonomous districts. 
(2) Although they are within the overall executive authority of the state 
concerned, but provision is made for the creation of District Councils for 
the exercise of certain legislative, executive, and judicial functions. 
(3) Such Councils will consist of not more than thirty members of whom not 
more than four shall be nominated by the Governor of the state concerned, 
and the rest shall be elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. 
(4) The elected members of the Councils shall hold office for a term of five 
years from the date appointed for the first meeting of the Council after the 
general elections to the Councils, unless the District Council is dissolved 
sooner by the Governor, and the nominated member shall hold office at the 
pleasure of the Governor. 
(5) The Council has legislative power in certain fields such as the management 
of a forest, inheritance of property, marriage, and social custom. The laws 
made by the Council have to be approved by the Governor. 
(6) The Council has judicial powers, civil and criminal, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the High Court. The Governor may also confer upon the 
Council the power to try certain suits or offences. 
(7) It has also the power to assess and collect land revenue, and to impose 
certain taxes.  
(8) The Council may establish, construct, or manage primary schools, 
dispensaries, markets, ferries, fisheries, roads, road transport and water 
ways, and also with the prior approval of the Governor, prescribe the 
language and the manner in which primary education shall be imparted in 
the primary schools in the district. The other areas to which the powers of 
the Council extend are: agriculture, animal husbandry, community projects, 
co-operative societies, social welfare, village planning and so on.   
(9) The Acts of State legislature shall not extend to matters on which the 
Councils have the power to legislate unless the relevant Council so directs 
by public notification. On other matters, the President of India, and the 
Governor of a State will decide the extent of application of an Act of 
Parliament, or an Act of a State Legislature respectively to an autonomous 
district. 
 
On the face of it, Articles 3-4 appear to be un-federal, if not anti-federal, since the 
flexible provisions for state creation affect the autonomy and integrity of the states. 
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This may not actually be the case if one considers the way federation in India was 
created, or is still being created. To begin with, one needs to look at the mode of 
federation-making in India. The federation-making in India has been carried out 
from above so that that the states are the effects of the federation rather than the 
other way round. It was not the states, or their representatives who sat at the 
Constituent Assembly to make the federation. Unlike the US and Switzerland, 
there were no pre-existing sovereign states in India who would create a federation 
as a compact. As we will see later, the territorial scenario in India at independence 
was more complex than it appears to be. The eleven provinces directly under the 
British as well as the 500-odd princely autocracies (indirectly under the British), 
after the Partition of India, were ethno-linguistically heterogenous, and there was, 
in most,  much mutual hatred, animosity and conflicts. The various constitutional 
measures, as we have described above, were so designed as to accommodate ethno-
regional identities, and to resolve conflicts.      
 The autonomy provisions for self-governance of aboriginal peoples in India 
(numbering about 100 million today) were designed and served to accommodate 
sub-regional aspirations of the relatively underdeveloped people. Thus the regional 
or district councils for the tribal people have often been the stepping stone for 
demanding greater regional identity in the form of states under the Indian 
constitution.   
 Both types of constitutional measures for regional accommodation of identity, 
as above, are designed for self-rule. There are clear constitutional distribution of 
powers and authority under three Lists between the federal and the State 
governments. The powers and functions of the tribal regional or district councils 
have also been clearly demarcated and protected in the Constitution.  
 
 
I N D I A N  N A T I O N A L I S M  A N D  R E G I O N A L I S M  
 
The above flexible constitutional provisions regarding statehood, or sub-statehood 
must be understood in the appropriate historical backdrop. Historians of modern 
India have established how the growth in Indian nationalism against British 
colonialism since the nineteenth century also gave birth to intense awakening 
among various region-based linguistic nationalities for identity and self-
determination, often in opposition to the pan-Indian nationalism (Desai 1944; 
Sarkar 1983; Bhargava et al eds: 1999; Banerjee 1992; and Das Gupta 2001). The 
specific contours some of such regional nationalism have also been identified in 
cases studies (Bhattacharyya 1989; Chatterjee 1986; Majumdar and Singh 1997). 
The mainstream Indian nationalism had continuously to grapple with regional 
nationalism. Given the heavy weight of regional identities of the people of India, 
the Indian National Congress (INC) could have hardly remained immune from it. It 
gradually became, in fact, an inter-regional coalition of forces. McLane (1977) 
(Das Gupta 2001: 51) argued that the INC had been so, since its formation in 1885, 
in order to generate a composite nationhood in India. The regional identities within 
the INC itself became, however, more intense. An historical research showed that 
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more than a decade after 1885, the most important leaders of the INC on a visit to 
UK on a political mission chose to identify themselves in a public statement as 
leaders of their respective regional associations based in different parts of India 
(Majumdar and Majumdar 1967: 44-45). As early as 1908, the INC recognised 
Bihar as a separate Congress Circle for congruence between linguistic and political 
boundaries, on the basis of a demand made by some Mahesh Narayan Singh in 
1894 (Banerjee 1992: 42). Some historical researches have established that the 
colonial administration’s attempt to see India of the future as a ‘Union of 
autonomous provinces’ was a powerful impetus behind the growth in language 
consciousness among the composite province like the Madras Presidency 
(Subrahmanyam 1984:117). The formation of the Andhra Congress Committee in 
1913 was a testimony to the growing demands of the Telegu speaking areas of the 
(Tamil-dominated) Madras Presidency to establish Telegu power over Telegu issue 
in the Presidency. Though till then contrary to its official policies, the Indian 
National Congress (INC), the main party of India’s independence, approved the 
Andhra Congress Committee in 1917, and at its Nagpur Congress in 1920 officially 
committed itself to a federal India based on the linguistically reorganized states. 
The INC even reconstituted itself in some federal form since the 1920s by re-
creating its various provincial committees on the basis of linguistic divisions of the 
country in order to give political expression to the growing region-based 
nationhood in India, and increasingly committed itself to a federal India.   
 
 
P O S T - I N D E P E N D E N C E  A C C O M M O D A T I O N  O F  
R E G I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y  
 
Three clear patterns can be identified in the post-independence (1947) phases of 
accommodation of regional identity through statehood. First, in the 1950s and 
1960s, intense (ethnic) mass mobilisation, often taking on a violent character, was 
the main force behind the state’s response with an institutional package for 
statehood. Andhra Pradesh in India’s south showed the way. The fast unto death in 
1952 of the legendary (Telugu) Gandhian leader Potti Sriramulu for a state for the 
Telegu-speakers out of the composite Madras Presidency moved an otherwise 
reluctant Jawaharlal Nehru, a top nationalist leader, and  the first prime minister of 
India, to concede to the demand for a separate state of Andhra Pradesh. The Union 
government also instituted the States Reorganization Commission (SRC) in 1953 
for redrawing the political map of India, and passed the famous States 
Reorganization Act, 1956 on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission. 
Interestingly enough, the SRC’s report (1955) was sympathetic to the regional 
cause: 
 
It is obviously an advantage that constituent units of a federation 
should have a minimum measure of internal cohesion. Likewise, a 
regional consciousness, not merely in the sense of a negative 
awareness of absence of repression or exploitation but also in the 
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sense of scope  for positive expression of the collective personality of 
a people inhabiting a state or a region may be conducive to the 
contentment and well-being of the community. Common language 
may not only promote the growth of such regional consciousness but 
also make for administrative convenience (as quoted in: Majumdar 
and Singh 1997: 104). 
 
Thus, on the basis, primarily, of language, major reorganisation of India’s territory 
was undertaken in the 1950 and 1960s. 27 states of categories A, B, and C in the 
original Constitution of India (1950) were reduced to 15 with equal status and 
powers. The 7th Amendment to the Constitution (1956) incorporated them into the 
Constitution. The state of Nagaland in India’s North-east, created in 1963, was 
perhaps the sole exception to the pattern in the 1950s and 1960s. It was created, 
after protracted struggle of the Naga tribes against the Indian state for a sovereign 
land independent from India, in recognition of their tribal identity. In the case of 
Punjab (1966), a combination of language and religion (Sikh) provided the basis of 
statehood. 
 Second, in the 1970s and 1980s, the main focus of reorganisation was India’s 
North-east. The basis of reorganisation was tribal insurgency for separation and 
statehood. The main institutional response of the Union government was the North-
eastern States Reorganisation Act, 1971 which upgraded the Union Territories of 
Manipur and Tripura, and the Sub-State of Meghalaya to full statehood, and 
Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh (then Tribal Districts) to Union Territories. The 
latter became states in 1986. Goa (based on Kokani language (8th Schedule)), 
which became a state in 1987, was the sole exception. Since India’s North-east has 
remained a perennial base for various kinds of movements for separation and 
political extremism, bipartite, or tripartite ethnic peace accords (Datta 1995) have 
been signed by the Government of India, affected State Government, and the ethnic 
leaders for a negotiated settlement. Such ethnic peace accords have been the bases 
for subsequent legislation at Union and State legislatures for instituting a new state, 
or a sub-state. Region-based tribal ethnicity, not language, was the principle of 
according statehood, or sub-statehood in the North-east. Interestingly enough, 
given the predominance of Christianity (the Baptist Mission) in some regions of the 
North-east, there was a movement for using religion as a basis of demanding 
statehood in the late  1960s. But, realising that religion was not going to be 
recognised as a basis, they quickly shifted to tribal loyalty (Weiner and Kazenstein 
1981). 
 Third, the movements for the three new states (created in 2000)—Chhatisgarh 
out of Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand out of Bihar and Uttaranchal out of Uttar 
Pradesh--- were long-drawn but became vigorous in the 1990s. But, as I have 
shown elsewhere in detail (Bhattacharyya 2001), the main basis was complex: a 
combination of tribal ethnicity, language, regional deprivation, and ecology. 
Language, however, played no important role in the creation of these states. The 
legislative processes, rather than any Commission, or ethnic peace accords, 
prescribed in the Constitution were followed in creating these states in 2000.  
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F E D E R A L  D E B A T E  I N  I N D I A :  C E N T R E  V S .  S T A T E ,  
O R  N A T I O N  V S .  R E G I O N  
 
Elsewhere, I have discussed the various aspects of the ongoing debates on Indian 
federalism (Bhattacharyya 2001). In this section, I will provide a brief outline of 
the debate in order to drive home the issue of regionalism as it figured in the 
ongoing discussions of federalism in India.   Since the coming into force of the 
Indian constitution on 26 January 1950 after some two centuries of British colonial 
rule, the nature of federalism that this constitution instituted has been subject to 
ongoing academic and political debates. Rather than treating it as a dead issue, 
every generation of scholars, both Indian and foreign, have thought and rethought 
about the nature, and implications of Indian federalism. Politicians, political 
parties, and mass media have also more or less regularly commented upon the 
nature and functioning of federalism in India.  
 Federalism in India is both a colonial and a nationalist legacy in the 
institutional sense of the term. The British unitary (nation-state) model of 
governance proved relatively ineffective for a vast and diverse country like India. 
The relative failure of their model of governance led them to introduce, by degrees, 
since the 1920s, doses of devolution and federalism in India in which the 
Government of India Act 1935 was the major institutional step (Aiyer 1965: 16; 
Morris-Jones 1987: 15-48).  Modelled after the Canadian federation (British 
Canadian Act 1867), this Act, Morris-Jones believes, pointed the pattern of 
governance in India ‘firmly in the direction of federalism’ (Morris-Jones 1987: 19).  
Nonetheless, the system of governance remained till the days of India’s 
independence heavily centralised. This was recognised by Morris-Jones himself: 
“The form of political structure handed over at independence was, for a country of 
India’s size and diversity, remarkably centre-directed” (Morris-Jones 1987: 121).  
 
 
C O N S T I T U E N T  A S S E M B L Y  ( 1 9 4 6 - 4 9 )  
 
Indian federation was not the compact of pre-existing sovereign states. The states 
in India, on the contrary, have remained the effects, rather than the cause of, Indian 
federation. The mode of making the federation followed was top-down rather than 
bottom-up. The Constituent Assembly (CA), which wrote the federal constitution 
of India, was composed of members (elected by the people on the basis of limited 
franchise) who were not the states’ representatives. The CA debates (CAD), thus, 
did not show the deep-seated conflicts of interests, which were revealed in 
Philadelphia in 1787. On the contrary, there was a virtual absence of conflict 
between the centralists and the provincialists (read ‘regionalist’), as one would 
expect in such a debate on federalism. Interestingly enough, the provincialists 
demanded increase revenue for provinces, but were agreed that the union 
government should collect the money and then distribute it among the units. 
“This,” said Granville Austin, “could hardly be called a traditional defence of 
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provincial autonomy” (Austin 1966: 187; Austin 1999). There were debates on the 
nomenclature of the federation. While the “Union of States” was finally decided, 
this decision was preceded by debates on preference for the indigenous terms for 
‘States’ like ‘pradesh’ (CAD, Vol. 2: 397-413). Interestingly, in the course of the 
above debates, some members made references to the ‘new basis in the near future’ 
for reconstitution of the states (CAD, Vol. 2: 406).  Written in the backdrop of the 
great communal riots of 1946 in India, and the Partition of India through a major 
separatism that gave rise to Pakistan in 1947, the states’ rights issue was secondary 
to the CA, and the allegiance to provincial governments was muted (Morris-Jones 
1957: 17). Nonetheless, state or provincial autonomy was not sacrificed in the 
emerging political model. While introducing the Draft Constitution, Dr B. R. 
Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, and the architect of the 
country’s constitution, described the constitution “federal inasmuch as its 
establishes what may be called a dual polity (which)….will consist of the Union at 
the centre and the States at the periphery each endowed with sovereign powers to 
be exercised in the field assigned to them by the Constitution” (Austin 1966: 188). 
He also made it clear that unlike the American constitution, the Indian Constitution 
avoided the “tight mold of federation” but instead was one, which could be “both 
unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances” 
(Austin 1966:188). For the sake of unity at that crucial historical juncture of India, 
the need for a strong central government was beyond dispute. The Indian 
nationalists always sought to blend federalism with centralism. As Nehru wrote in 
1936: “It is likely that free India may be a Federation, though in any event there 
must be a great deal of unitary control” (Austin: 1966: 198). The other ardent 
nationalists sitting in the CA also advocated unitary principle and a strong central 
government for holding the vast, diverse country together. Realistically, the 
founding fathers of the constitution were guided pragmatically not to adhere to any 
theory or dogma for a vast and diverse country with its peculiar problems like 
India. They were also aware that federalism was “not a definite concept”, and 
lacked a “stable meaning” (Austin 1966: 187) As a result, the CA followed what 
Austin called “pick and choose” method to see what features of the existing 
federations suited the genius of the nation best. It meant modifications of the 
established ideas about the construction of federal governments and their relations 
with the constituent units. The result was “a new kind of federation to meet India’s 
peculiar needs” (Austin 1966: 187).  
 
 
P O S T - 1 9 5 0  D E B A T E  
 
Immediately after its inauguration in 1950, Indian federalism began to receive 
diverse, often contrasting and contradictory assessments at the hand of academic 
observers, Indian and western. The earlier accounts of Indian federalism showed a 
lot of intellectual reservations about the subject. The centralised character of the 
Indian federation vis-à-vis the states’ rights has baffled and preoccupied most of 
the observers. K. C. Wheare (1951/1953/1963) made one of the first authoritative 
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comments on Indian federalism and described the Indian constitution as “a system 
of government which was quasi-federal...a unitary state with subsidiary federal 
features rather than a federal state with subsidiary unitary features” (Wheare 
1951:28). But in the subsequent fourth edition of his work in 1963 he was still 
doubtful of the federal nature of the Indian constitution, and described it as ‘quasi-
federal’ but added that it was not meant to be a criticism of the constitution or the 
government since “A quasi-federal system may well be most appropriate for 
India”. (Wheare 1963: 28) Ivor Jennings (1953) accepted India to be a“ federation 
with strong centralising tendencies” (Jennings 1953: 1). The states’ rights issue, as 
we have seen above, was hardly debated in the CA. But it was taken up already in 
the early 1950s by observers as a critical area of judging the federal character of 
the Indian polity. Thus K. V. Rao (1953) in a paper on “Centre-State Relations in 
Theory and Practice“ took an extreme view to show how the centre was usurping 
the rights of the states (Rao 1953). In his subsequent work too he maintained strong 
reservations about Indian federalism: “We can now sum up our impressions about 
Indian federalism. There are federal features, but they are not strong enough to 
make India a federation on par with any known federation so far” (Rao 1966: 328).  
 At the other end of the intellectual spectrum, there were scholars like Paul 
Appleby (1953), N. Srinivasan (1954) and Charles Alexandrowich (1957) who 
were inclined to take a more positive view of Indian federalism. In view of the fact 
that the federal legislation get implemented only at the state level and by the states, 
and from the administrative point of view which makes the centre dependent on the 
states, (in a situation in which the central government meant “all staff and no 
line”), Appleby was doubtless about the federal character of the Indian polity 
(Appleby 1953; Kothari 1970: 118; Watts 1970: 138-42). Both Srinivasan and 
Alexandrowich considered the federal character of the Indian constitution as 
indisputable on the ground that the Indian federalism was a case sui generis 
(Srinivasan 1954; Alexandrovich 1957).  
 Against the backdrop of the first major and successful federal territorial 
reorganisation of India in the late 1950s (mostly on a linguistic basis), on the one 
hand, and the first major Congress’s electoral defeat (since independence) in 
India’s fourth general elections in 1967, which returned regionally oriented non-
Congress governments to majority of India’s states, on the other hand, the Indian 
federalism began to receive serious academic attention from the 1960s onwards 
(Bhattacharyya 2001: 1-53) Indian politics witnessed from the mid-sixties onwards 
a growing assertion of state and regional identities formulated often in demands for 
more autonomy for states, and a restructuring of ‘centre-state’ relations. The India-
Pakistan war of 1962, the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India’s post-
colonial state, in 1964, and the growing organisational weaknesses in the INC 
which split in 1969 added to the challenges to Indian democracy and federalism.  
Morris-Jones, who saw federalism as a matter of process and degree, considered it 
fair to say that India’s constitution was federal with important unitary features 
(Morris-Jones 1987: 19) although he was alert that India called itself not a 
federation but a ‘union’, and that the fact that other observers termed it ‘quasi-
federal’ (Morris-Jones 1987: 121). But on the whole, he did not fail to identify the 
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critical aspects of Indian federalism, and the forces which made it to work. The 
political character of Indian federalism attracted most of his attention. He identified 
the ‘hard competitive bargaining’ as ‘the character of Indian federalism 
throughout’ (Morris-Jones 1987: 132). He also pointed out that it was the ‘informal 
power structures of Congress’ that had been serving as the lubricant to the practical 
mechanisms of federalism in India, (Morris-Jones 1987: 121, 153) a view which 
has been shared by many observers of Indian politics ever since (Watts 1966; 
Kothari 1970; Rudolph and Rudolph: 1987). He also took note of the changes in 
Indian federalism since 1947 when it was ‘remarkably centre-directed’ to the 
sixties when there took place the ‘tendency for the balance of power to move 
against the Centre and in favour of the States’ (Morris-Jones 1987: 121, 249). 
However, such tendencies and changes were enough basis for taking India into the 
federal club: “India must, however, be put alongside other federal states; it must 
also be properly put in relation to its own past. Now this entails seeing that neither 
the period of alien rule nor the first years after independence can be at all 
reasonably taken as the norm...This means first that India must be judged as a 
federal state.”3 Marcus Franda also believed in the federal character of the Indian 
polity, and argues that on the whole the Centre had been respectful of states’ rights 
(Franda 1968).  
 Granville Austin’s The Indian Constitution Cornerstone of a Nation (1966) 
offered the most authoritative and exhaustive account of Indian federalism from 
constitutional-legal point of view. Rejecting such appellations as ‘statutory 
decentralisation’ or ‘quasi-federal’ as interesting but ‘not particularly illuminating’, 
he pointed out the pragmatic character of Indian federalism which, to him, was a 
‘new kind of federalism to meet India’s peculiar needs’, and which is what he calls 
‘a co-operative federalism’ that ‘produces a strong central government yet not 
necessarily resulting in weak provincial governments.[ Austin 1966: 186-87, 186-
243; Austin 1999)  
 
                                                 
3 The innovative capacity of Indian federalism impressed Morris-Jones evident in the 
creation of more states,and sub-state within states (e.g., Meghalaya within Assam in 1970). 
He was very appreciative of such measures: “The device is ingenius - the area has its own 
assembly and ministers and responsibility for most of the subjects dealt with by state, but 
Assam still retains law and order and police functions and the Governor, High Court and 
public service commission are common.With regional restiveness evident in some other 
states - Saurastra in Gujarat, Telengana in Andhra - it may be a model whose imitation, 
while further complicating governmental process, will ease certain troublesome tensions”. 
(p. 124). There were, however, Indian scholars like S. A. H. Haqqi (1964) who still stuck to 
the old appellation of India as ‘not a federation but a unitary state with subsdiary federal 
features’ which Carl J. Friedrich (1968) criticised as ‘too narrow a conception of 
federalism’. See for more details, Friedrich C. J. Trends of Federalism in Theory and 
Practice, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, p. 135, chap. 18 of “India: Federalism and Cultural 
Diversification”. In this chapter, he had no hesitation in accepting India as a federation. He 
said: ‘... India is clearly undergoing a federalising process in the course of which federal 
diversity is increasing’, a statement which was contrary to many dangerous predictions 
made about India’s disintegration found in such works as Harrison S. India: The Most 
Dangerous Decades (1960). K. Santhanam Union State Relations in India (1960) too took a 
negative view of the functioning of Indian federalism.  
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 In the sixties, the most thorough political scientific account of Indian 
federalism was offered by Watts (Watts 1966). Going beyond the many 
reservations of observers since the inauguration of the republic, Watts concluded: 
“India may, therefore, be best described as a predominantly federal system with 
some unitary features” (Watts 1966: 356). The founding fathers of the Indian 
Constitution were very much pragmatically determined in devising the model for 
India because for a vast, diverse country with many special problems and 
peculiarities, no single theory or model borrowed from abroad was useful. Also, 
the Indian federal model was made to be flexible in order to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Watts quoted approvingly Dr B R Ambedkar, the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitution who said: “The Draft Constitution 
can be both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of the time and 
circumstances. In normal times, it is framed to work as a federal system.”(Watts 
1966: 356). This has equipped the federal polity with the mechanisms, and the 
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. The Indian federalism’s success as an 
institutional solution to intra-societal conflicts and tensions in a diverse society has 
also been noted by Bombwall (Bombwall 1967; ed. 1978). Echoing perhaps Watts, 
Carl Friedrich also recognised the growing strength of Indian federalism, and its 
capacity to increasingly differentiate itself. He said: “India is clearly undergoing a 
federalizing process in the course of which federal diversity is increasing. It is, 
[....], a recurrent feature of this process that in the course of democratizing of a 
society, regional and linguistic-cultural communities become more articulate and 
demand recognition in the form of a set of political institutions, including 
safeguards for the identity of the particular community” (Friedrich 1968: 135-36) . 
 At the time of the Partition of India in 1947, signalling the failure of the last 
colonial attempt at federalism in India between the Hindus and the Muslims, 
followed by the great communal violence in 1946, coupled with the special 
problems of integrating some 561 princely autocracies with the Indian Union, a 
federation with a strong centre seemed to be a foregone conclusion. But to Rajni 
Kothari (1970) this went against two decentralising traditions of India. First, it 
went against the strong tradition of a decentralised polity and the great roles that 
local politicians and notables played in giving the nationalist movement its nation-
wide character (Kothari 1970:91) Second, it also went against Gandhian ideal of 
villages as the foundation of the Indian nation (Kothari 1970: 91). Given the above, 
federalism that came out, argued Kothari, was ‘an ambivalent federalism which 
gave the Centre much scope and initiative, a major share in resources and all 
residual functions, but simultaneously gave the states considerable powers and 
scope for manoeuvre’ (Kothari 1970: 91-92). 
 
 
C R I S I S  I N  F E D E R A L I S M  
 
The period between the late 1960s and the late 1970s was the most difficult one for 
Indian democracy and federalism. It was when Indian federalism faced so far with 
a crisis threatening its very existence. This was the most critical phase in the life of 
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the republic since independence in 1947. But this crisis in Indian federalism was 
not its own making. It was caused by factors and forces, which were external, 
emanating from the socio-economic and political realities of India. More 
importantly, it was caused by a series of political factors. Beginning with the 
Congress electoral defeat in the fourth general elections (1967), the famous split in 
the INC (1969), the most determining force in the Indian polity, the famous 
Opposition movement especially by Jay Prakash Narayan in the early 1970s in 
Bihar, the left extremist movements in West Bengal, and its violent state repression 
in the early seventies, the period was closed with the imposition of a nation-wide 
authoritarian Emergency rule for 18 months (1975-77) which suspended both 
democracy and federalism. This was the period which witnessed extreme 
concentration and centralisation of powers in the Centre, to be more precise, in the 
personal leadership of Mrs Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India. The 
crippling effects of this regime on India’s political institutions have been 
documented in many accounts of Indian politics written ever since (Kothari 1996; 
1988; 1989; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; Mitra 1978; Hasan et. al. eds 1989; 
Bhattacharyya 1994). It was when through centralisation and concentration of 
power, the Indian polity grossly deviated from federalism. As Kothari wrote: “The 
political constitutional sphere has itself become prone to the same tendencies of 
centralisation, domination and inequity” leading to “institutional disorder” 
(Kothari: 1970 351). Morris-Jones characterised the 1960s as the period of what he 
called “diminishing institutionalisation” (Morris-Jones 1987: 294). With the end of 
the Emergency and the restoration of democracy in 1977, federalism in India was 
given a new lease of life, legitimacy and capacity. This has been reflected in the 
scholarly reflections on Indian federalism in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
 
 
P O S T - E M E R G E N C Y  ( 1 9 7 7 )  P E R I O D  
 
The lingering doubts about the existence of a strong centre in Indian federation 
have remained in minds of scholars who have written or commented upon Indian 
federalism. (Kurian and Varughese 1981; Bose ed 1987). And yet, Indian 
federalism has also been receiving some positive appraisal of its critical role in 
India’s unity since the 1980s from some scholars. In the new chapter that was 
added to the 1987 reprint of his famous book, Morris-Jones was sceptical about the 
management capacity of the Centre to effectively hold the system although he still 
found enough evidences, which made the system to move on (Morris-Jones 1987: 
259-72). Bombwall viewing it from an ethno-nationalist standpoint was confident 
about the “requisite institutional and processual flexibility and resilience” of Indian 
federalism “to accommodate ethnic and regional discord while at the same time, 
defining the parameters within which such discord will be tolerated.” (Bombwall 
1985: 191). Rudolph and Rudolph noted the how both the growing centralisation 
and concentration of powers, on the one hand, and the growing strength of 
regionalism, on the other hand, had put the federal system under severe strain 
(Rudolph and Rudolph: 98-99). But they admitted that India’s cultural 
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heterogeneity has been expressed in the ‘federal organisation of power’.4 Amal 
Ray (Bose ed. 1987) also acknowledged the federalist implication of the Janata 
experiment (1977-80). The Janata government, itself an agglomeration of many 
regionally based groups and parties, was conducive to the status of regional 
government, and therefore there took place a balanced operation of the India’s 
federal system during the Janata phase (Ray 1987: 157). 
 
 
D E B A T E  S I N C E  T H E  1 9 8 0 S  
 
The most distinctive aspects of the debates on Indian federalism since the 1980s 
are that apart from the persistent issue of states’ rights, regional and local identities, 
and decentralisation have continuously been the focussed. The official 
commissions set up for the purpose, whether at the federal or state levels, have also 
recommended further state autonomy and decentralisation: 
 
Decentralisation of real power to these local institutions would thus 
help defuse the threat of centrifugal forces, increase popular 
involvement all along the line, broaden the base of our democratic 
polity, promote efficiency and improve the health and stability of 
inter-governmental relations (Khan ed 1997: 212). 
 
Further state autonomy and decentralisation and the question of regional and local 
identities are the themes of many publications (Khan ed. 1992; 1997; Mitra and 
Lewis eds. 1996; Vijapur ed. 1998; Sathyamurthy ed. 1985; Bhattacharyya 2000 & 
2001; Pal  1984). Kurian and Varughese (1981) prefaced the discussion on centre-
state relations with the suggestion that ‘the framework has yet to be devised for 
combining local initiative with national aspirations, and important federal features 
with certain unitary characteristics to ensure all-India perspective of development’. 
The Marxist leader E. M. S. Nambudripad found in regionalism the assertion of 
rights of the federating units, and strongly advocated for expanding states’rights 
(Numbudripad: 1981:65-66). The greater powers to the states was also the central 
theme in the famous West Bengal Government Memorandum on Centre-State 
Relations of December 1, 1977 submitted to the Union government in which it was 
asserted: “We are definitely for strong states, but on no account do we want a weak 
centre. The concept of strong states is not necessarily in contradiction to that of a 
strong centre, once their respective spheres of authority are clearly marked out” 
(Kurian and Varughese eds. 1981: 204-14). 
 To take a step further down state autonomy, local self-government as another 
tier of Indian federalism has also been emphasised increasingly in this period. 
Maheswari strongly argued in favour of making local government as an essential 
                                                 
4 They also noted that under the Janata government (1977-80), the federal system and local 
and village administration were rejuvenated (p. 163). In the period since the Emergency, 
federalism has remained a top agenda for most political parties in India, and received 
continuous judicial support.  
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element of federalism in view of the ‘step motherly treatment of local government 
at the hands of the state governments’ (Bose ed. 1987:30). He made a strong plea: 
‘Federalism must be made to be a three-tier system’ (Bose ed. 1987: 30). Khan also 
advocated simultaneously the need for urban and rural grassroots democracy as a 
devolutionary measure as well as space for the regions and sub-regional identities 
in his proposal for a new federal balance, and identity in India (Khan: 1992: 15). 
He described Indian federalism as a ‘bouquet’ that exhibits different flowers, each 
with its individuality yet tied together as a single whole (Khan 1992 :13). He 
wrote: 
 
The process of infrastructuring of the Indian federation is not yet over. 
Therefore, political demands of viable regions for new administrative 
arrangements are not necessarily antithetical to the territorial integrity 
of the country. For, every urge for autonomy is not divisive, but most 
probably a complementary force; it would not lead to balkanisation 
but to the restructuring of nation identity (Khan 1992: 16).  
 
Nirmal Mukarji, former Cabinet Secretary, Government of India and former 
Governor of Punjab, emphasised the need for a more federal India for linking 
decentralisation with sub-nationalism. He said: 
 
The starting point for fresh thinking in regard to devolution has to be 
the recognition of sub-nationalism as a growing reality. The federal 
centre would, as a first inference, have to be viewed as the focal point 
at which various sub-national identities converge rather than as a 
source from which power is imposed upon them. Devolutionary 
measures would, as a consequence, need to be worked out in a spirit 
of partnership between the federal and sub-national levels rather than 
unilaterally by a dominant centre (Grover and Arora eds. 1994: 399).  
 
Paul Brass (Brass 1990/1992: 66) has pointed out that often the advocates of 
regional autonomy see with suspicion that moves initiated by the centre for 
decentralisation of Indian politics to the local level since this might undermine 
regional autonomy. In his earlier work on Indian federalism and decentralisation he 
argued that on a long-term basis India had not been a case of continuous 
centralisation. As he said: “Insofar as long-term tendencies or underlying persistent 
patterns can be discerned across institutions and policy areas in India, the 
directions or the underlying patterns are towards pluralism, regionalism, and 
decentralisation.” (Brass 1989: 225). 
 He also added that the tendencies towards pluralism were clearer than those 
towards regionalism and decentralisation made so possible by the high degree of 
interdependence of the centre and the states. The central government, for Brass, has 
pursued persistently policies of pluralism in relation the rights of linguistic and 
religious minorities in India in the face of the assimilationist and discriminatory 
policies of several states in relation to their minorities (Brass: 1989:228). But 
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nonetheless the dilemma of building a stable power by the centre has been 
immense since power in India is inherently regional and local in character (Brass 
1989: 227).5 
 Rajni Kothari, India’s leading political scientist, gave full recognition to the 
growing federal political reality in India: 
 
Never before has the Indian polity been more multi-centric than now. 
With so many states being run by various opposition parties and with 
each of them becoming more assertive vis-a-vis the centre than was 
earlier the case, with the wide spread of regionalism and the upsurge 
in so many places of regional identities (Seminar, 357, 1989: 13). 
 
He has identified three major forms of the movements, which demand further 
federalizing of the Indian polity. First, there is the gradual return to the tradition of 
voluntarism, which as a characteristic of Indian society for a long time has been 
resurfacing again. Second, there is the demand for decentralization of power and 
resources, not just to the state level, but to the levels below. This is related to the 
growing consensus that a centralised state apparatus is unable to deliver goods and 
services efficiently in a vast and diverse country as India. Third, there is the 
upsurge of ethnic identities, which are demanding more autonomous spaces for 
themselves, with some of them demanding statehood within the federal set-up. 
Welcoming those developments for a more federal democratic India, Kothari has 
perceived the issue of federalism in India within a broader democratic canvass. As 
he says, “The battle for federalism in India is fundamentally a battle for greater 
democracy in which the people come into their own through social identities, 
organisational forms and institutional frameworks with which they feel 
comfortable and through which they can find their potency and self-respect” 
(Kothari 1989: 14). This is a novel democratic point in understanding federalism. 
The federal debate in India has usually been reduced to the problem of ‘centre-state 
relations’ i.e., strong central authority versus states’ rights. Kothari finds this rather 
artificial which does not reflect the people or the great diversity of Indian society 
and culture. He rightly pointed out that the exponents of states’ rights are as much 
to blame as the central authority for the plight of the people.  
 
 
I M P A C T  O F  R E G I O N A L  A C C O M M O D A T I O N  O F  I D E N T I T Y  
 
To be sure, the manner of redistribution of financial resources among the states by 
the national level institutions such as the Planning Commission and the Union 
Finance Commission, are diversity-sensitive, and designed to redress regional 
                                                 
5 Brass has made an interesting argument about the effects of President’s Rule in the States 
in India. Going against all the existing accounts, he said although the increased frequency 
of President’s rule (Art. 356 of the Indian Constitution), particularly since the sixties, have 
resulted in the reduction in state autonomy, this reduction has not meant effective central 
control over state politics or effective centralisation of power. On the contrary, he said, that 
effective control has declined (p. 247). 
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imbalances in development (Bhattacharyya 2000: 247-305). But such measures are 
complementary to the more important method of statehood, which allows greater 
scope for autonomous action. The various federal institutional measures allowing 
for the exercise of internal self- determination of collective identity whether 
linguistic, or tribal, in India since the 1950s, has served to contain much of 
secessionism, and political separatism, and thus to strengthen national unity, and 
cohesion. Statehood for regional autonomy, whether linguistically based (e.g., in 
the 1950s and 1960s), or otherwise (e.g., tribal identity, ecology and so on since the 
1970s) in India has served to transform yesterday’s ethnic rebels into tomorrow’s 
responsible rulers. Das Gupta has shown that after gaining autonomy, the 
‘linguistically reorganized regions quickly settled down to work out a constructive 
partnership with the national leadership, the national economic planning and the 
national administrative system’ (Das Gupta 1988: 151). Das Gupta has also noted 
remarkable economic performance of the newly created states (in the 1950s and 
1960s): of the 6 such states (Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat, 
Haryana and Punjab), 4 (Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat and Maharashtra) achieved the 
highest per capital income in the country (Das Gupta 1988: 152). These four states 
remained consistently at the top until the 1980s; Andhra Pradesh ranked 9 of 15 
states in 1950-51 (in terms of development), but raised itself up to 7 in 1971-72 and 
retained it until 1981-82. In terms of annual growth rate as well as the successes at 
poverty alleviation, these states’ record was above the national average (Das Gupta 
1988: 152-53). This is a powerful example of how a recognized and secure identity 
rather than causing secessionism can be a factor for economic development.  
 What has been the political impact of regional accommodation of identity? Has 
it meant only the regionalisation of politics? Is the national identity a lost terrain? 
The available researches do not suggest so. The presence of the region on the 
national scene is seen by many as positive, as part of the process of community 
formation and empowerment. (Mitra and Singh 1999: 156). Mitra and Singh’s 
survey of partisan voting in the 1996 (Lok Sabha) general elections showed that 
while there had been a “higher awareness of the regional level of government”, 
voters still retained a “a great deal of trust” in all three layers of government 
(35.2% in Central Government; 37.2% in State Government; and 39% in Local 
Government) (Mitra and Singh 1999: 161). This is a further proof that the regional 
identities in India have not always defined themselves in opposition to and at the 
expense of, the national identity. D. L. Sheth, a leading Indian political scientist, 
has noticed a democratic effect of such process in that India’s representative 
democracy has moved closed to the people who feel more involved and show 
greater concern for institutions of local and regional governance (Mitra and Singh 
1999: 156). In my study of sub-state level regional accommodation of identity in 
Tripura in India’s North-east, I have shown how the Tripura Tribal Autonomous 
District Council (TTADC), formed in 1985, has served to protect an otherwise 
endangered tribal identity in the state by providing a democratic platform for 
former separatists to become a party of governance, and thereby reduced 
significantly the bases of political extremism in the state (Bhattacharyya 2003: 11-
12).  For a long time since independence, Indians’ ability to govern themselves has 
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been the subject of wild speculation among observers of Indian politics. The rise of 
vigorous regionalism in various parts of the country since the 1950s for recognition 
and identity led the scholars to predict the country’s imminent ‘balkanization’ and 
collapse (Harrison 1960). To talk of regionalism, then, was to talk of 
‘balkanization’. After some fifty years of increasing federal differentiation in 
matters of identity, such fears and anxiety seem to have gone. The following 
editorial of the New York Times (October 8, 1999) (after the general elections in 
1999) stands in sharp contrast to all the prevailing misconceptions about Indians’ 
ability to govern the world’s most diverse country of more than one billion people: 
 
As 360 million Indians voted over the last month, the world’s largest 
and most fractious democracy once again set a stirring example for all 
nations… India’s rich diversity sometimes looks like an obstacle to 
unity. But the latest election has proved that a commitment to 
resolving differences peacefully and democratically can transform 
diversity into a source of strength (Kohli ed. 2001: 1). 
 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
In conclusion, I would like to highlight two issues. First, India’s federal 
reconciliation of regional identity with autonomy has a democratic aspect. It 
operates at two levels. Any political demand for statehood, or sub-statehood, to 
begin with, must, first, demonstrate identifiable popular support born of mass 
mobilization, before such demands are conceded to. Secondly, the political 
institutions achieved (whether a state government, or a regional or tribal council) 
must be elected by universal adult suffrage in every five years, as it is the normal 
political practice for such representative institutions throughout India. Democracy 
rather than ethnicity is thus the legitimacy basis of such political institutions. Das 
Gupta (Kohli 2001: 49) has termed this “democratic responsiveness to cultural 
differences” in India.  
 Second, going beyond the above, I have argued elsewhere (Bhattacharyya: 
2003) that Indian federalism has provided the institutional terrain within which 
various ‘ethnic nations’ in India (e.g., Tamil, Telegu, Bengali, Sikh, Gujarati, 
Manipuri, or Assamese) have taken shape, defined themselves, and are able to 
protect and to celebrate their identity. The underlying principle in various regional 
accommodations of identity in India has remained internal self-determination. As 
we have emphasized in the paper, internal self-determination has remained the 
predominant form in which regionalism, and even sub-regionalism, has sought to 
express itself. The regional and sub-regional accommodation of identity in India 
has served to weaken the bases of political secessionism and separatism while not 
defeating the principle of (internal) self-determination (of nations). Long time ago, 
Joan V. Bondurant (1958) expressed her apprehension about the future unity of 
India as follows: “But if religious, communal, cultural and linguistic differences 
threaten the unity of India, they present, as well, a challenge to the political Union. 
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For ‘unity in diversity’ is at once a threat and a promise” (Bondurant 1958: 1). Our 
study strongly suggests that while religio-communal differences in India are still a 
matter of some serious concern, the threat from the country’s cultural and linguistic 
differences has most effectively been met in ways in which diversity has been 
transformed into a strength. 
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